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Resolving the Bounding Puzzles

My theory so far comprises three commitments: A conditional “if A, B” encodes the disposition to infer its consequent from its antecedent, together with how things would be if its antecedent were true. Whether you believe or leave open the possibility of a conditional depends on whether you are inferentially disposed in accordance with theContinue reading “Resolving the Bounding Puzzles”

On Inferences and Conditionals

In the previous two posts, I articulated two bounding puzzles that reveal a tension between the informational content and logical strength of conditionals. In this post, I want to articulate and motivate my positive theory of conditionals. I will come back to show how it handles the bounding puzzles in the next post. If youContinue reading “On Inferences and Conditionals”

Subjunctive Bounding

In the previous post, I discussed a puzzle about the meaning of indicative conditionals, and I mentioned that a similar puzzle arises for subjunctive conditionals. But what do these terms “indicative” and “subjunctive” mean? The terms refer to a grammatical distinction, which we can informally describe this way: the indicatives are the simple-looking conditionals, whileContinue reading “Subjunctive Bounding”

On cancelling and sincerity

In a recent op-ed, “Should we cancel Aristotle?”, Agnes Callard suggests that “we philosophers,” and by extension, I presume, all members of civil society, “must countenance the possibility of radical disagreement.” But, she observes, what if your intellectual opponent espouses views you regard as not only wrong, but morally and intellectually repugnant? Callard distinguishes literalContinue reading “On cancelling and sincerity”

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